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Chapter One: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 
Fraud and its Affects 
  
Fraud has been an issue since the formation of businesses began. This includes 
bribes, skimming money from the company, and stealing product; just to name a few 
examples. Types of fraud are split into three categories: asset misappropriation, 
financial statement fraud, and corruption. The main focus of this research will be on the 
form of fraud known as asset misappropriation. (Associate of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 2012) 
 
 Because of the recent recession, fraud has increased more rapidly than ever 
before. In 2009, “one in three companies around the world reported they were the 
victims of business fraud during the past 12 months.” (Gillentine, 2009) This rate has 
since increased, according to Kroll, 70% of companies are suffering from at least one 
type of fraud in 2013. (Kroll, 2013) These statistics are from the fraud cases that have 
been confirmed and reported. There are many instances where fraud will never be 
caught and if it is, depending on the type of fraud committed, could take from one year 
to three years to confirm.  
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Asset misappropriation is the most common form of fraud, with approximately 86.7% 
of fraud cases reported being a form of asset misappropriation. (Associate of Certified 
Fraud Examiners, 2012) Why is this so much higher than the other two types of fraud? 
This is because it is the easiest form of fraud to commit, with financial statement and 
corruption usually involving multiple individuals and this makes it harder to conceal. The 
relieving factor of asset misappropriation is that even though it is committed most often, 
it has the lowest mean loss, $120,000 in 2012, compared to the other types of fraud. 
With the average price of loss and the percentage of frequency, asset misappropriation 
has cost companies more than $10 million. That is approximately $2 million more than 
the next closest type of fraud, corruption. (Associate of Certified Fraud Examiners, 
2012)  
 
How People Commit Fraud 
 
Originally there were thought to be three different factors contributing to a person 
deciding to commit an act of fraud. These three factors are included in the Fraud 
Triangle. The three different factors are pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. 
Pressure is the motivation of the person to commit fraud, usually a financial burden. 
Next is opportunity, which is the method by which the crime could be committed. Finally 
is the rationalization, this is how the person justifies, in their own mind, committing the 
crime. These factors were first defined by the criminologist Donald Cressey. (Fraud 
Triangle, 2010) This research will not focus on the theory itself, but on the addition of a 
fourth factor, capabilities. 
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The Fraud Diamond is a new theory that adds a capabilities factor to the original 
three. Authors David Wolfe and Dana Hermanson were the first people to propose this 
fourth element in a 2004 CPA Journal article. (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004) Capability is 
a trait of the individual committing the fraud, which drives them to seek an opportunity 
and exploit it. This brings in a factor other than the original environmental factors, now 
considering behavioral predictors. (Hay, 2013) 
Capabilities has six supporting traits: positioning, intelligence, ego, coercion, 
deceit, and stress management. Fraudsters could have all six traits or any combination 
of them. The first trait is positioning, which means that the individual is in a position not 
available to others, allowing them to create or exploit an opportunity. Intelligence is that 
the individual is creative and smart enough to understand and exploit the weakness to 
their advantage. Ego means the fraudster has the confidence in their abilities to not be 
caught. Next is coercion, where the individual can influence others to assist or conceal 
the fraud that is occurring. Then deceit, the fraudster probably will be able to lie or divert 
convincingly. Lastly there is stress management, committing and the ongoing 
concealing of the fraud will cause continuous stress and, therefore, the fraudster can 
appropriately manage the stress. (Hay, 2013) 
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Contribution to the Literature 
 
There has not been an extensive amount of research done on the aspects of the 
capabilities of the fraud diamond. Since the capabilities trait came to light, most people 
have just bypassed it and stuck with the original fraud triangle. What these people are 
misunderstanding is that capabilities goes into depth of what it takes mentally to commit 
fraud. With this understanding owners, managers, and any other employee can better 
understand fraudsters and their traits. With this knowledge everyone could help prevent 
fraud form occurring in their places of work.  
 In this research the objective is to perform a statistical analysis; by mapping the 
capabilities attribute to the form of fraud known as asset misappropriation. The reason 
for using asset misappropriation is the high amount of occurrences giving more cases to 
use for statistical testing. Also, there are more ways of committing asset 
misappropriation fraud than the other two forms; therefore there is a greater variety of 
traits that will arise from the different cases. 
The purpose of the statistical test is to determine if there is a significant 
difference in the proportions of cases possessing each of between the six traits of 
capabilities. If there is a difference, then employers and managers have criteria that 
they can look for when evaluating current and prospective employees. With this they 
can focus on the main contributing factors and even implement psychological testing to 
identify these areas among potential employees, to further prevent fraud occurrences in 
their organization. 
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Chapter Two: Research 
Methodology 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the fourth aspect of the fraud diamond, 
capabilities, which is the newest manner to look at fraudsters’ traits. Within this 
capabilities aspect this study is going to determine if there is a significant difference in 
the prevalence of the six traits of capabilities. The data for this study came from two 
sources, Donwycoff and Audit Executive Board. In contribution to this data the Ohio 
Society of CPA’s website was used to analyze the data and put the fraud cases into 
categories and map into the attributes of capabilities. Other sources were examined for 
this purpose, but the same basic format and information was used as the Ohio Society 
of CPA’s website. The Ohio Society had the most detail, therefore was the one used to 
obtain the best analysis, also to avoid being redundant. This chapter discusses the 
research design, hypotheses, population, research instrument, data collection, and data 
analysis.  
 
Research Design 
 
The point of this study is to evaluate the capabilities aspect of the fraud diamond 
for asset misappropriation. There will be 25 fraud cases mapped to the six traits of 
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capabilities and a statistical analysis performed. The cases will be carefully mapped by 
using extensive detail acquired about the six individual traits. After the cases are 
carefully mapped, the statistical analysis will be performed on the preceding results.   
The type of statistical analysis that is going to be performed is a Chi-squared 
Test of the Equality of Proportions. This test analyzes categorical types of data and the 
difference of more than two proportions, which fits the data set and parameters of this 
study. This test is being performed on the mapping of the cases, to determine if there is 
a significant difference in the presence of the six traits. After the test is conducted, if 
there is a significant difference then further testing will have to be performed to 
determine which trait or traits are significantly different. 
 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis and Testing 
Hypothesis 1: Is there a difference in the existence of the six factors? 
 
Below is the hypothesis of the initial testing of the mapped fraud cases. 
 
Ho: All proportions are equal. 
(Ho: Π1=Π2=Π3=Π4=Π5=Π6) 
Ha: At least one proportion is different. 
 
Π1= the proportion of trait, Positioning 
 
 Π2= the proportion of trait, Intelligence 
 
 Π3= the proportion of trait, Ego 
 
 Π4= the proportion of trait, Coercion 
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 Π5= the proportion of trait, Deceit 
 
 Π6= the proportion of trait, Stress Management 
 
For testing the proportions of the attributes the hypothesis above will be used. A Chi-
squared Test of the Equality of Proportions will be used in deciding to reject or accept 
the null hypothesis. 
 
If the initial testing rejects the null, then additional testing will need to be performed 
to acquire the appropriate results of this study. The hypothesis and testing procedures 
are as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Which factors are different? 
Ho: All individual attributes’ proportions are equal. 
(Ho: Π1=Π2, Π1=Π3, Π1=Π4, Π1=Π5, Π1=Π6, Π2=Π3, Π2=Π4, Π2=Π5, Π2=Π6,   
Π3=Π4, Π3=Π5, Π3=Π6, Π4=Π5, Π4=Π6, Π5=Π6) 
Ha: At least one individual attributes’ proportions are different. 
  
The testing of individual proportions will be conducted by the Marascuilo 
Procedure. The results will show which individual attributes’ proportions are 
significantly different. 
 
Population 
 
 
Fraud is being committed every day, but is not caught nearly as often as it is 
committed. The population for this research, therefore, is based on a small portion of 
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the asset misappropriation cases that have been caught, and are available to the public. 
The reason for more cases not being available to the public is the private nature of the 
matters, legality of the fraud cases, or the high cost of obtaining more cases.  
For the purposes of this study, the cases used provided a sufficient number for 
testing. Also, the cases provided necessary details to create maps on the individual 
attributes of the capabilities aspect. 
 
Data Collection 
 
 
The data used in this study is strictly secondary data, provided by multiple sources, 
Donwycoff and Audit Executive Board. Donwycoff is an individual who has worked in 
the accounting field for 25 years and currently holds licensures including: CMA, CIA, 
and CFE. Donwycoff conducts independent studies and surveys of companies and then 
relays the data to the public for their awareness. The Audit Executive Board is an 
accredited agency that many companies subscribe to for updates in the audit field of 
accounting. It also provides results of fraud studies to these companies for their 
knowledge and use.  
 
Data Analysis 
 
 
For testing the hypotheses stated above, in regards to the six traits of the 
capabilities aspect, a Chi-squared Test of the Equality of Proportions will be used. This 
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test was selected because this study’s goal is to see if there is one, or more, trait that is 
more or less significant to companies when evaluating employees and potential hires.  
The data used for the testing is categorical. That is the data, cases, are put into 
categories for the purpose of the testing. The data will be put into a contingency table 
for easy comparison between the individual attributes and the total occurrences. The 
cases will be mapped to the six attributes of capabilities in the contingency table.  
Conclusions 
 
 
Chapter Two describes the research methodology used to evaluate the six 
attributes of the capabilities aspect of the fraud diamond. The research design, 
hypotheses, population, research instrument, data collection methods, and data 
analysis measures relating to this study have been discussed preceding this conclusion. 
The following chapter will present study results and details about these results. 
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Chapter Three: Research Results 
 
 The research results are based on statistical testing done on 25 fraud cases. 
These fraud cases were mapped to the six attributes of capabilities. This was done with 
details about the attributes provided through Ohio Society of CPA’s website and the 
information that came along with the cases from the sources: Donwycoff and Audit 
Executive Board.  
 
Testing of Mapped Cases 
 
This study seeks to evaluate the six attributes of capabilities using real fraud 
cases of asset misappropriation. The literature around fraud stated that asset 
misappropriation is the most often committed form of fraud. Also, that there haven’t 
been many studies conducted into the attributes of capabilities, therefore this study is 
trying to depict if there are significant differences of occurrences of the attributes. In 
doing this, it should allow employers to better understand a person’s ability or lack 
thereof to commit fraud. 
To evaluate the attributes on the mapped cases, Chi-Squared tests were 
conducted. For testing the null hypothesis, a Chi-squared test for equality of proportions 
was used. The results of the testing of the mapped cases, Table 1, by using a 
significance level of 0.05, a p-value of 0, having a critical value of 11.07, and the 
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calculated test statistic of 14.679. This concluded in the null hypothesis being rejected 
meaning that there are differences in the prevalence of the six attributes.  
 
Table 1: Summary Results of Mapped Cases*  
Chi-Squared Test for Equality of Proportions 
Critical Value: 11.07 
X2 Test Statistic:  14.677924528 
P-Value: 0 
Decision: Reject the null Hypothesis 
 
*The full testing of the mapped attributes and the results are located in Appendix 4. 
 
The second step of testing consists of determining which of the attributes occur 
more or less commonly. This is done by testing each attribute against all others.  
 
Testing of Individual Attributes 
 
To test if there are differences between individual attributes, additional tests were 
performed. These tests were performed on each attribute being paired with another 
attribute until all attributes have been paired with one another. Then the Marascuilo 
Procedure was run to determine what attributes are different from each other.  
 The summary of the 15 tests are listed in Table 2. For the full look at the testing 
and its results, refer to Appendix 5. 
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Table 2: Summary of Individual Attribute Testing 
Attributes 
Compared 
Critical 
Value 
Test Statistic 
(Difference in 
Proportions) 
Decision 
Positioning Vs. 
Intelligence 0.435744 0.2 
Accept 
Positioning Vs. 
Ego 0.284195 0.24 
Accept 
Positioning Vs. 
Coercion 0.401912 0.52 
Reject 
Positioning Vs. 
Deceit 0.284195 0.24 
Accept 
Positioning Vs. 
Stress Management 0.420856 0.08 
Accept 
Intelligence Vs. 
Ego 0.330312 0.44 
Reject 
Intelligence Vs. 
Coercion 0.435744 0.32 
Accept 
Intelligence Vs. 
Deceit 0.330312 0.44 
Reject 
Intelligence Vs. 
Stress Management 0.453276 0.12 
Accept 
Ego Vs. 
Coercion 0.284195 0.76 
Reject 
Ego Vs. 
Deceit 0 0 
Accept 
Ego Vs. 
Stress Management 0.310408 0.32 
Reject 
Coercion Vs. 
Deceit 0.284195 0.76 
Reject 
Coercion Vs. 
Stress Management 0.420856 0.44 
Reject 
Deceit Vs. 
Stress Management 0.310408 0.32 
Reject 
 
 To evaluate the individual attributes, the Marascuilo Procedure was conducted 
on the paired attributes. For testing the null hypothesis, a Chi-squared test for equality 
of proportions was used. The testing used a significance level of 0.05; this is the same 
as the initial Chi-square test. The critical value from initial hypothesis test was used to 
calculate the critical value for this individual pairs in the Marascuilo Procedure.  
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As the summary depicts above, out of the 15 tests, there were eight rejections of 
the null hypothesis. In these rejections four out of the eight had the attribute, coercion. 
The results show that coercion is statistically different from the other attributes, with the 
exception of intelligence. The other four rejections consisted of stress management and 
intelligence being statistically different when paired with ego and deceit. Table 3 shows 
a summary of the rejections. 
 
Table 3: Summary of Rejections 
Attributes 
Compared 
First attribute’s 
Proportion 
Second Attribute’s 
Proportion 
Test Statistic 
(Difference in 
Proportions) 
Positioning Vs. 
        Coercion 
.76 .24 .52 
Intelligence Vs. 
             Ego 
.56 1 .44 
Intelligence Vs. 
            Deceit 
.56 1 .44 
Ego Vs. 
         Coercion 
1 .24 .76 
Ego Vs. 
Stress Management 
1 .68 .32 
Coercion Vs. 
Deceit 
.24 1 .76 
Coercion Vs. 
Stress Management 
.24 .68 .44 
Deceit Vs. 
Stress Management 
1 .68 .32 
  
 
 
  
Page 15 of 29 
 
Chapter Four: Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
 
The purpose of this study was to take the new aspect of a fraudster from the 
fraud diamond, capabilities, and evaluate the attributes that composes it. This was 
achieved through examining, mapping, and testing the asset misappropriation fraud 
cases accumulated for this study. The testing for this study was to determine whether 
there were significant differences among the attributes of capabilities.  
Two stages of testing had to be performed in this study; one to determine if there 
was a significant difference among the six different attributes and the second was to 
determine which attributes were significantly different. The first test consisted of taking 
the mapped cases to the attributes and testing the total occurrences.  Because this test 
rejected the null, the second stage of testing was performed. The Marascuilo Procedure 
was performed to determine which attributes where significantly different from the 
others.  
Conclusion 
 
The research showed that there is a significant difference in the attributes of 
capabilities in the 25 fraud cases represented. There were a variety of different values 
for each attribute category, which caused the significant difference. This range spanned 
from the least with six occurrences in coercion, to the high of 25 for both ego and deceit. 
This first stage of testing does not show which attributes are significant from the others. 
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The significant difference from the first stage of testing forced an additional stage 
of testing. This stage of the Marascuilo Procedure was to test the individual attributes 
compared to one another to further determine the significant attribute or attributes. In 
conclusion, eight of the tests did reject the null hypothesis: positioning versus coercion, 
intelligence versus ego, intelligence versus deceit, ego versus coercion, ego versus 
stress management, coercion versus deceit, coercion versus stress management, and 
deceit versus stress management.  
 The rejections occurred because of the difference of the proportions of the 
paired attributes. These proportions are based on the occurrences divided by the 
number of possible occurrence for each attribute. These results show that there are 
significant differences between the attributes, where coercion occurred most but was 
not the only one that occurred multiple times. Therefore the other factors are significant 
as well.  
 
Recommendations 
 
There are several recommendations that can be drawn related to these aspects 
of capabilities. The first is directly related to the results of the testing. Coercion may 
have occurred significantly less than the other attributes, but that does not mean that it 
is not any less important than the others. In fact, it may be more important to put more 
focus on this attribute. Coercion actually costs companies more than double, than if a 
person were to commit fraud alone. In 2012 the median loss for an individual person 
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committing fraud was $100,000, compared to fraud being committed with coercion with 
multiple perpetrators, $250,000. (Associate of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012)   
In addition to the capabilities, these recommendations also apply to all the other 
rejected attributes. Whereas the other attributes are more emotional factors, they may 
not seem to be addressed but they are. With all these recommendations they will 
directly help deter the fraud from occurring or help identify the attributes in a person. 
 
Internal Controls 
 
The coercion attribute can be incredibly hard to detect if the right internal controls 
are not in place.  Even if there are controls, coercion between the right people can 
override them. Therefore, companies have to be extremely careful with their internal 
controls. One major internal control that benefits companies by deterring coercion is job 
rotation or mandatory vacation for all employees. With this control in place there is 
approximately a 62.5% reduction in the duration of fraud committed and a 33% 
reduction in the loss compared to not having this control in place. Another angle to look 
at it is instead of the fraud being committed for 24 months it only occurred 9 months and 
it only cost the company $100,000 compared to $150,000. (Associate of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 2012)  
For larger companies these amounts don’t affect them as much, but for smaller 
companies these amounts could threaten their survival. Also, it is more likely that a 
large company already has these controls in place where as a small one may not. This 
increases their susceptibility of the fraud occurring in their organization. Another form of 
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internal control that may be easier and more beneficial for smaller companies is 
management review.  
The internal control of management review is probably more applicable for a 
small business, because in small businesses the manger could very well also be the 
owner. This entails a greater liability and loss from the effects of fraud being committed 
in their business. In turn having this high level internal control can reduce the loss by 
about 46% and cut the duration of fraud down to 14 months instead of 24. (Associate of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012)  
These are just two examples of internal controls that can deter coercion and 
overall fraud being committed, but there are many others that could be implemented 
into companies. Just to name a few controls that companies could implement: tip 
hotlines, fraud training, and an internal audit function. All have their costs and benefits, 
and the benefits should outweigh the costs. Just as an illustration, if it takes $100,000 to 
implement the control but it prevents $500,000 worth of fraud it would be worth it. That 
is just hypothetical and no one could say for sure how effective an internal control will 
be.  
Effective internal controls will help prevent and or catch fraud, no matter what 
attribute you are looking at. If the person is in the right position but is rotated to new 
position every few years or management review of their work, it will be extremely hard 
for them to commit the fraud. It is the same with the other attributes, it won’t matter how 
big a person’s ego, how intelligent, managing stress, or their deceiving abilities, 
effective internal controls should prevent the occurrence of fraud. 
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Pre-employment tests 
 
In addition of internal controls being added to a company, another suggestion is 
to give prospective employees pre-employment tests. Most pre-employment tests that a 
company can buy have multiple parts, such as evaluating the skills and aptitude in 
addition to an individual’s personality. For the purpose of this research, the suggestion 
is about the personality aspect of the tests.  
The idea for this suggestion is to concentrate on the attributes of capabilities, to 
identify people with high risk of fraud committing capabilities.  With the results of the 
pre-employment test a manager could then compare all the candidates for a position not 
only on education and experience, but also on their fraud committing potential. To 
further expound, if two candidates are almost exactly equal but one is a higher risk, the 
manager may choose the candidate with the lower risk. If a candidate with the high risk 
results is chosen for the position, then the manager is aware of the potential fraud 
based on the personality test. With this knowledge the manager could better monitor the 
individual, which managers should do for all employees, and ensure the person’s duties 
and responsibilities are rotated on a timely basis and ensure the mandatory vacation 
time is taken.  
Some companies will be hesitant to start pre-employment testing because of the 
cost. The prices of these tests aren’t readily available. No manager wants to spend 
more money than is necessary. Pre-employment test providers charge two different 
ways; they charge by each test provided or by a subscription based on how many tests 
will be needed in a year.  
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Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The study of the capabilities aspect could be better evaluated with a larger data 
set. Although these 25 cases were sufficient, the more data, the better the results will 
be. The additional cases are available, but they can be costly to obtain. If additional 
research is done around this topic, all data should be updated to the most current 
information available.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 21 of 29 
 
Bibliography 
1. Associate of Certified Fraud Examiners. (2012). Report to the Nations on Occupational 
Fraud and Abuse. Ausitn, TX: ACFE. 
2. Corporate Executive Board. (2014). View Fraud Scenarios . Retrieved from CEB Audit 
Leadership Council: 
https://audit.executiveboard.com/Members/Topics/Abstract.aspx?cid=101223277&s=HP
2&utm_source=Eloqua&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ADR-AKAWATRA-
11.22.2013-M-D-NL-News-All-All-All-BL-ID-
NID&utm_source=InsightDaily&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=adr-11.22.201 
3. Donwycoff. (2014). Asset Misappropriation. Retrieved from Donwycoff- Fraud 
Supression: http://donwycoff.wordpress.com/asset-misappropriation/ 
4. Fraud Triangle. (2010, September 1). Employers: Learn The “Fraud Triangle” To Prevent 
Fraud. Retrieved MAy 5, 2013, from FraudTraingle.com: 
http://www.fraudtriangle.com/employers-learn-fraud-triangle-prevent-fraud/ 
5. Gillentine, A. (2009, 17 December). Business Fraud on the Rise during Recession. 
Retrieved May 5, 2013, from The Colorado Springs Business Journal: 
http://csbj.com/2009/12/17/business-fraud-on-the-rise-during-recession/ 
6. Hay, L. (2013, 13 5). The changing profile of fraud. Retrieved from OSCPA: 
http://www.ohioscpa.com/mobile/current-news/2013/03/13/the-changing-profile-of-
fraud?c=1 
7. Kroll. (2013). 2013/2014 Global Fraud Report. Retrieved from fraud.kroll.com: 
http://www.kroll.com/media/KRL_FraudReport2013-
14_USLetterPRESS_REVISED_10182013.pdf 
8. Wolfe, D. T., & Hermanson, D. R. (2004, December 4). The Fraud Diamond: 
Considering the Four Elements of Fraud. Retrieved from Th CPA Journal: 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/essentials/p38.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Page 22 of 29 
 
Appendix: 
 
 
Appendix 1- Comparison of costs of Fraud in 2012 
 
Type of Fraud Asset 
Misappropriation 
Financial Statement 
Fraud 
Corruption 
Percent of cases* 86.7% 7.6% 33.4% 
Mean cost $120,000 $1,000,000 $250,000 
Total cost for 2012 $10,404,000 $7,600,000 $8,350,000 
 
*Cases equal more than 100% because of multiple types of fraud being committed in the 
same case. 
(Associate of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012) 
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Appendix 2: List of Fraud Cases 
 
Corresponding 
Number 
Fraud Title 
1 Ghost Card 
2 Gift Card 
3 Purchasing card 
4 Payroll file changes 
5 Manipulating P.O.'s 
6 Pocketing Maintenance 
Fees 
7 "Accidental" 
Overpayments 
8 Cashing In 
9 Stealing Incentives 
10 Land Purchases 
11 Recruiter Fees 
12 Weak Inventory Controls 
13 Shipping Labels 
14 Productivity Figures 
15 Benefits System 
16 Side Business 
17 Baierl Acura 
18 Receiving a Gratuity 
19 Church Point Housing 
20 San Jose Police Officers 
21 Payroll Fraud 
22 San Mateo Com. College 
23 Giants P/R Manager 
24 Auto Parts 
Manufacturers 
25 Campaign Treasury 
Fraud 
  
(Donwycoff, 2014) (Corporate Executive Board, 2014) 
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Appendix 3: Fraud Cases Mapped to Capabilities’ Attributes 
 
Positioning Intelligence Ego Coercion Deceit 
Stress 
management 
3. Purchasing Card 2. Gift Card 1. Ghost Card 10. Land Purchases 1. Ghost Card 3. Purchasing Card 
4. Payroll file 
changes 
4. Payroll file 
changes 2. Gift Card 
14. Productivity 
Figures 2. Gift Card 
4. Payroll file 
changes 
6. Pocketing 
Maintenance Fees 
9. Stealing 
Incentives 3. Purchasing Card 
18. Receiving a 
Gratuity 3. Purchasing Card 
6. Pocketing 
Maintenance Fees 
7. "Accidental"  10. Land Purchases 
4. Payroll file 
changes 
19. Church Point 
Housing 
4. Payroll file 
changes 
7. "Accidental" 
Overpayments 
8. Cashing In 11. Recruiter Fees 
5. Manipulating 
P.O.'s 
22. San Mateo 
Com. College 
5. Manipulating 
P.O.'s 8. Cashing In 
9. Stealing 
Incentives 13. Shipping Labels 
6. Pocketing 
Maintenance Fees 
24. Auto Parts 
Manufacturers 
6. Pocketing 
Maintenance Fees 
9. Stealing 
Incentives 
11. Recruiter Fees 
14. Productivity 
Figures 
7. "Accidental" 
Overpayments 
 
7. "Accidental" 
Overpayments 11. Recruiter Fees 
12. Weak Inventory  15. Benefits System 8. Cashing In 
 
8. Cashing In 
12. Weak Inventory 
Controls 
14. Productivity 
Figures 16. Side Business 
9. Stealing 
Incentives 
 
9. Stealing 
Incentives 13. Shipping Labels 
15. Benefits System 17. Baierl Acura 10. Land Purchases 
 
10. Land Purchases 
14. Productivity 
Figures 
16. Side Business 19. Church Point  11. Recruiter Fees 
 
11. Recruiter Fees 15. Benefits System 
17. Baierl Acura 21. Payroll Fraud 
12. Weak Inventory 
Controls 
 
12. Weak Inventory 
Controls 16. Side Business 
18. Receiving 
Gratuity 24. Auto Parts  13. Shipping Labels 
 
13. Shipping Labels 17. Baierl Acura 
19. Church Point  25. Campaign  14. Productivity  
 
14. Productivity  19. Church Point  
20. San Jose Police  
 
15. Benefits System 
 
15. Benefits System 
23. Giants P/R 
Manager 
21. Payroll Fraud 
 
16. Side Business 
 
16. Side Business 
24. Auto Parts 
Manufacturers 
22. San Mateo  
 
17. Baierl Acura 
 
17. Baierl Acura 25. Campaign  
23. Giants P/R 
Manager 
 
18. Receiving a 
Gratuity 
 
18. Receiving a 
Gratuity 
 25. Campaign  
 
19. Church Point  
 
19. Church Point  
 
  
20. San Jose Police 
Officers 
 
20. San Jose Police 
Officers 
 
  
21. Payroll Fraud 
 
21. Payroll Fraud 
 
  
22. San Mateo  
 
22. San Mateo  
 
  
23. Giants P/R  
 
23. Giants P/R  
 
  
24. Auto Parts  
 
24. Auto Parts  
 
  
25. Campaign  
 
25. Campaign  
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Appendix 4: Initial Chi2 Test Results 
 
Fraud Case Positioning Intelligence Ego Coercion Deceit Stress 
Management 
Total 
occurrences 
1   1  1  2 
2  1 1  1  3 
3 1  1  1 1 4 
4 1 1 1  1 1 5 
5   1  1  2 
6 1  1  1 1 4 
7 1  1  1 1 4 
8 1  1  1 1 4 
9 1 1 1  1 1 5 
10  1 1 1 1  4 
11 1 1 1  1 1 5 
12 1  1  1 1 4 
13  1 1  1 1 4 
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
15 1 1 1  1 1 5 
16 1 1 1  1 1 5 
17 1 1 1  1 1 5 
18 1  1 1 1  4 
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
20 1  1  1  3 
21 1 1 1  1  4 
22 1  1 1 1  4 
23 1  1  1 1 4 
24  1 1 1 1 1 5 
25 1 1 1  1 1 5 
Total 
Occurrences 
 
19 
 
14 
 
25 
 
6 
 
25 
 
17 
 
106 
 
Title       Total Test 
Statistic 
Total 
Occurrences 
 
19 
 
14 
 
25 
 
6 
 
25 
 
17 
 
 
Expected 17.667 17.667 17.667 17.667 17.667 17.667  
Difference 1.333 -3.667 7.333 -11.667 7.333 -0.667  
Individual TS 0.1006 0.7610 3.0440 7.7044 3.0440 0.0252 14.67924528 
 
Data and Results 
Significance Level 5% 
DF 5 
Critical Value 11.07 
Test Statistic 14.679 
P-Value 0 
Reject the null hypothesis 
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Appendix 5: Secondary Chi2 Test Results 
Pos Vs Int Proprtions 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Positioning 0.76     
Intelligence 0.56     
Difference 0.2 0.435743778 Accept 
    
Pos VS EGO Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Positioning 0.76     
Ego 1     
Difference 0.24 0.284194863 Accept 
    
Pos VS Coer Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Positioning 0.76     
Coercion 0.24     
Difference 0.52 0.401912229 Reject 
    
Pos VS Deceit Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Positioning 0.76     
Deceit 1     
Difference 0.24 0.284194863 Accept 
    
Pos VS SM Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Positioning 0.76     
Stress 
Management 0.68     
Difference 0.08 0.42085627 Accept 
    
Int VS Ego Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Intelligence 0.56     
Ego 1     
Difference 0.44 0.330311853 Reject 
    
Int VS Coer Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Intelligence 0.56     
Coercion 0.24     
Totals 0.32 0.435743778 Accept 
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Int VS Deceit Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Intelligence 0.56     
Deceit 1     
Difference 0.44 0.330311853 Reject 
    
Int VS SM Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Intelligence 0.56     
Stress 
Management 0.68     
Difference 0.12 0.453276075 Accept 
    
Ego VS Coer Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Ego 1     
Coercion 0.24     
Difference 0.76 0.284194863 Reject 
    
Ego VS Deceit Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Ego 1     
Deceit 1     
Difference 0 0 Accept 
    
Ego VS SM Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Ego 1     
Stress 
Management 0.68     
Difference 0.32 0.310408247 Reject 
    
Coer VS Deceit Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Coercion 0.24     
Deceit 1     
Difference 0.76 0.284194863 Reject 
    
Coer VS SM Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Coercion 0.24     
Stress 
Management 0.68     
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Difference 0.44 0.42085627 Reject 
    
Deceit VS SM Actual 
Critical Value 
calculated  Decision 
Deceit 1     
Stress 
Management 0.68     
Difference 0.32 0.310408247 Reject 
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Appendix 6: Critical Value Chart 
 
 
